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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

MYERS V. STATE: THE DISCOVERY OF AN OUTSTANDING
ARREST WARRANT DURING AN ILLEGAL TRAFFIC STOP
MA Y BE SUFFICIENT TO REMOVE THE TAINT FROM
EVIDENCE THAT IS SUBSEQUENTLY SEIZED.
By: Levi Zaslow
In an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant during an
illegal traffic stop may be sufficient to remove the taint from the
evidence subsequently seized. Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 291, 909
A.2d 1048, 1066 (2006). In so holding, the Court established that an
outstanding arrest warrant is an intervening cause that may be
sufficient to attenuate an illegal stop and provide independent probable
cause for an arrest and subsequent searches. [d. at 291, 909 A.2d at
1066.
On February 12, 2003, a Pennsylvania police officer initiated a
traffic stop of Ernest Myers ("Myers") because he noticed that Myers
was parked illegally, acted in what he felt was a suspicious manner,
and thereafter drove at a high rate of speed. The officer estimated
Myers was going 40 mph in a 25 mph zone. Furthermore, the time,
place, and Myers' similarity to the description of a suspect in a
number of burglaries in the area, piqued the officer's attention.
During the stop, the officer noticed a long screwdriver which would be
capable of making pry marks similar to those found at the crime
scenes and learned of outstanding arrest warrants for Myers from
Washington County, Maryland. The officer arrested Myers and
conducted a search of the car. As a result of the arrest, the
Washington County Sherriff's department executed search warrants in
Maryland which led to the discovery of stolen property.
Myers was first convicted of "theft by receipt of stolen goods" in
Pennsylvania, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ("Superior
Court"), Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court, reversed and
held that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence. The
Circuit Court for Washington County denied Myers' motion to
suppress, and a jury convicted him of theft and imposed a sentence of
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ten years incarceration. Myers appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland which affirmed his conviction. Myers petitioned
for and received certiorari from the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed whether the
decision of the Superior Court was binding on Maryland courts.
Myers, 395 Md. at 274, 909 A.2d at 1056. Myers maintained that the
circuit court was bound to follow the Superior Court's conclusions that
there was no probable cause to initiate the traffic stop; there was no
probable cause to believe Myers was involved in criminal activity; and
that the exclusionary rule barred the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by the Pennsylvania police. Id. Finally, the Court addressed
whether any evidence obtained as a result of his arrest was "derived
from the fruit of the poisonous tree," and therefore should not have
been considered in the search warrant application. /d.
The Court began its analysis by recognizing the general rule that
the law of the state in which the arrest was made determines the
legality and reasonableness of a stop absent a controlling federal
statute. Id. at 275, 909 A.2d at 1056. The Court assumed "arguendo"
that the initial traffic stop was invalid because, under Pennsylvania
law, the officer did not have probable cause; although, they did not
express an opinion as to whether they were bound to follow that
determination. Id. at 278, 909 A.2d at 1058. Also, the Court
determined that the federal exclusionary rule was the appropriate
remedy in this case because the Superior Court did not expressly rely
on the Pennsylvania Constitution or any other Pennsylvania law in
suppressing the evidence. Id.
The Court ruled that the Pennsylvania police officer lacked a
"reasonable articulable suspicion" to believe that Myers was involved
in any criminal activity. Id. at 280, 909 A.2d at 1059. In making this
determination, the Court viewed the totality of the circumstances and
held that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and no
probable cause to stop Myers' vehicle. [d. at 281, 909 A.2d at 1060.
Therefore, the Court was left to determine whether the evidence
admitted in the circuit court was the "exploitation of that illegality," or
attenuated from its original taint by the discovery of the arrest warrant.
Id.
The general rule is that illegally obtained physical, verbal, or other
evidence should be suppressed, thereby furthering the purpose of the
rule "to deter lawless and unwarranted searches by law enforcement
officers." Id. at 282, 909 A.2d at 1060 (quoting Wong Sun v. United
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States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963)). There are, however, three
judicially recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule which will
remove the taint of an illegal seizure. Myers, 395 Md. at 284, 909
A.2d at 1062. The three exceptions are attenuation, the independent
source doctrine, and inevitable discovery. Id. at 284-85, 909 A.2d at
1062 (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, (1939)
(establishing attenuation as a sufficiently intervening circumstance to
remove taint); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984)
(concluding that if the evidence would have been discovered through
an independent source, it should not be suppressed); Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431,443 n.4 (1984) (allowing for the admission of evidence
that would inevitably have been discovered). The only relevant
exception in the present case was whether the challenged evidence was
sufficiently attenuated to remove the taint of the initial stop. Myers,
395 Md. at 285, 909 A.2d at 1062.

In determining whether evidence has been sufficiently attenuated
from its initial taint, the Supreme Court established three factors to aid
in its determination: "1) the time elapsed between the illegality and the
acquis~tion of the evidence; 2) the presence of intervening
circumstances; and 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct." Myers, 395 Md. at 285-86, 909 A.2d at 1062 (quoting
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)). Simply stated, the
attenuation doctrine is a way to determine whether there is a strong
enough connection between the illegally obtained evidence and the
primary taint to warrant exclusion. Myers, 395 Md. at 286, 909 A.2d
at 1063.
In its analysis, the Court concluded that although there were a
number of seizures over a period of time, including some immediately
after Myers' arrest, the question of timing is not dispositive, and the
mere fact that there was little time between the illegal stop and the
seizure will not independently sustain the primary taint. Id. at 291-92,
909 A.2d at 1066. The Court also found that the subsequent discovery
of the outstanding warrants was sufficient to remove the initial taint of
the illegal seizure and was therefore not considered to be fruit of the
poisonous tree. Id. at 291, 909 A.2d at 1066. Finally, the Court
recognized that although the warrants were sufficient to remove the
taint, it is the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct that is
central to the analysis. [d. at 292,909 A.2d at 1066.
Under that analysis, the Court concluded that the Pennsylvania
officer's conduct was not to effectuate an arrest, but was based on
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what he believed to be suspicious activity. Id. at 293, 909 A.2d at
1067. Therefore, although perhaps illegal, the purpose of the officer's
stop was not egregious and flagrant. Id. The Court maintained,
however, that if the purpose of the initial stop was blatantly egregious
and in violation of Myers' Fourth Amendment rights, or if the purpose
of the stop was to search the vehicle, the search warrants would not be
sufficient attenuation. Id. at 292, 909 A.2d at 1066. Furthermore, the
Maryland investigator acted with probable cause, reasonably, and in
good faith. /d. at 295, 909 A.2d at 1068.
Myers v. State further blurs the line for police officers who must
make immediate search and seizure determinations.
Maryland
practitioners and citizens must be aware that illegal police activity will
often be attenuated or justified based on a standard of "objective"
reasonableness. In this era of ever-shrinking Fourth Amendment
rights, Maryland courts are clearly aligning themselves with those
jurisdictions that consider illegal citizen activity to be a greater danger
than illegal police activity.

